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Is H.A. Simon a Theoretician of Decentralized Planning? A Comparison with 
F.A. Hayek on Planning, Market, and Organizations 
 
Herbert A. Simon acknowledged Friedrich A. Hayek as a founder of the notion of bounded rationality; 
yet Simon considered Hayek’s perspective incomplete, and, more in general, their views on market 
mechanisms, planning, and organization exhibit considerable differences.  
The comparison between these authors sheds light on Simon’s interpretation of planning, which emerges 
within his theory of organization (and not in traditional debates on socialism). Contrary to Hayek, he 
maintained that planning, in specific circumstances, is more advantageous than the market; and in both 
administration and organization, it involves a decentralized structure based on near independent sub-
units. Decentralization of decisions also appears in social planning, which evolves through continuous 
interactions among planners (i.e., agents and institutions), and it is a process connoted by the absence of 
“fixed goals”. Finally, Simon defined modern economies more in terms of “organizational economies” 
than in those of “market economies” and this highlights a further difference with respect to the Austrian 
economist. This leads to analysis of the nature of organizations as hierarchical and “near-decomposable” 
structures, which refers to Simon’s theory of complexity and gives an epistemological explanation to the 
relation between centralization and decentralization. 
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Introduction 
 
There are few direct intellectual connections between Friedrich A. Hayek and 
Herbert A. Simon. Yet Simon, in some circumstances, recognised Hayek’s 
fundamental role in describing and providing arguments for bounded rationality 
(henceforth, BR). This opinion, although only sketched, was reiterated over time 
(Simon et al. 1992; March and Simon, 1993 [1958]; Simon, 1983, 1991a, 1996 [1969]). 
Probably the best known acknowledgement appears in The Sciences of the 
Artificial, where Simon maintains that 
 
“No one has characterized market mechanisms better than Friedrich von Hayek […] His defense did 
not rest primarily upon the supposed optimum attained by them but rather upon the limits of the inner 
environment – the computational limits of human beings” (Simon 1996 [1969], p. 34). 
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Yet, this favourable judgement on Hayek notwithstanding, a few lines later Simon 
puts forward some non-Hayekian arguments. In particular, contrary to Hayek’s theory 
on central role of the market, he states “the reasons why all economic activities are not 
left to market forces” but are mostly fulfilled by organizations, which in general are 
characterized by decentralized structures (Simon 1996 [1969], p. 35 and ff.). In short, 
despite Simon’s partial acceptance of Hayek’s perspective, the outcome is a radical 
reformulation of certain fundamental concepts. 
In what follows I shall seek to show the differences that emerge when one 
compares Hayek’s and Simon’s theories on planning, market, and organization, starting 
from the shared elements in their notions of BR. In particular, section 1 describes in 
essential terms how Simon’s juvenile representations of planning and the market were 
linked to the intellectual climate of the “Chicago school” of political science. Sections 
2 and 3 discuss why, according to Simon, BR cannot be simply treated as an argument 
in favour of market mechanism as - he said - Hayek maintained. A crucial role in 
Simon’s analysis is played by the notion of planning (which should be interpreted in 
light of his theory of the organization as a decentralized mechanism), and by the idea 
that, under specific conditions, planning furnishes advantageous procedures for 
decision-making. Sections 4 and 5 treat Hayek’s and Simon’s differences as regards the 
notion of social planning in more theoretical terms. Section 6 shows how Hayek and 
Simon gave different explanations of coordination systems in modern economies: the 
former pointed out the prevalent role of the market as a spontaneous order; the latter 
stressed the fundamental function of organizations (that is, distinctive planning 
structures). Section 7 examines the notion of organization as a part of Simon’s general 
theory of complexity, and in particular how the epistemological concepts of 
“hierarchy” and “near decomposability” shed light on the functioning of modern 
economic systems, although his analysis of the market is problematic in some respects.  
This comparative analysis provides an unusual portrayal of Simon: that of a 
distinctive theoretician of planning (in particular of decentralized planning), although 
he never set out a systematic theory but rather elaborated a set of concepts closely 
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related to his main strands of research. First, the advantages of different economic 
systems must be measured on empirical grounds, weighing costs and benefits. And this 
perspective, in different ways, characterizes both Simon’s juvenile and mature work. 
Second, his view on planning is framed within organizational theory and contrasts with 
that of socialist central planning. In this sense, theory of organization is part of the 
problem. Third, planning both in firms and in central administration necessarily implies 
decentralization in order to govern complexity by means of sub-units whose task is to 
break complex problems down into more tractable sub-problems. More in general, a 
number of actors intervene by constantly modifying the original planning of the central 
administration by means of their decentralized choices. Continuous interaction 
consequently arises between the “members of an organization or society” and 
institutional planners, and agents’ behaviours take the form of adaptive responses to the 
plan. Fourth, Simon refined his theory over time, and when he applied the notion of 
“social planning without fixed goals”, he delineated an evolutionary concept of 
planning as a coherent part of the sciences of the artificial epistemology. Fifth, this 
latter involves his theory of complexity, which represents economic systems as sets of 
relations among organizations (and among their sub-units, which exhibit some degrees 
of independence) rather than as market coordination. As a consequence, the notions of 
“hierarchy” and “near-decomposability” once again show that decision-making 
processes in organizations are essentially decentralized, and that the units of analysis 
used to explain decentralization are organizations (with their departments), not 
individuals, who are subsumed in these structures. 
Parts of these topics emerge from direct comparison with Hayek; others arise from 
indirect comparison between the authors. In short, on the one hand analysis of Hayek’s 
and Simon’s theories makes it possible to delineate theoretical differences between the 
two economists (contrary to the increasingly widespread opinion that they can be 
considered complementary thinkers, in that they endorsed non-neoclassical views and 
adopted the concept of bounded rationality); on the other hand, it enables light to be 
shed on a less evident aspect of Simon’s thought: his theoretical approach to planning. 
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1. A short historical (and biographical) preamble 
 
Simon was deeply involved in the Chicago intellectual milieu both as a student and 
subsequently as a member of the Department of Political Sciences in the 1930s. In the 
post-Great Depression climate, the figure of Charles E. Merriam, chairman of the 
department, was highly influential (Simon, 1991b, pp. 55-63). In particular, the basic 
tenet of the “Chicago School” of political science was that “conscious, rational 
coordination […] was essential for democracy as well as for efficiency”, and Merriam 
and his colleagues were convinced that “Societies needed to be led and economies 
needed to be regulated for there to be progress” (Crowther-Heyck, 2005, p. 44). 
Merriam’s philosophy was applied by the city manager movement (during the 1920s 
and 1930s), and to federal, state, and local planning (in the 1930s) and, an empirical 
issue was Merriam’s collaboration with the National Resources Planning Board. 
Another important experience for Simon was shared with Clarence Ridley, director 
of the International City Managers’ Association, and it culminated in Measuring 
Municipal Activities (1938), a book in which the authors focused on the “measurement 
of planning”, and on the need to possess information in order efficiently to evaluate 
interventions in every sphere of planning (Ridley and Simon, 1943, p. 67; Simon, 
1991b, pp. 64-65 and 70-72; Augier and March, 2002, p. 4). In fact, Ridley and Simon 
were convinced that city planning made it possible to integrate the dispersed needs of 
the public into a rational plan. For these reasons, as regards this period, Simon as “the 
quintessential product of Chicago social science in the 1930s” has been called “a strong 
advocate of rational planning” (Crowther-Heyck, 2005, pp. 58 and 94). Therefore, it is 
from this perspective that the following sentence can be interpreted: “There is no a 
priori reason why the community should select the competitive market as the 
institutional means of organizing its activities, any more than it should select a 
governmental organization” (Simon, 1941, p. 326). 1 
                                                
1 In similar vein, Simon maintains: “There does not seem to be any valid reason why the revenue-
expenditure process in governmental agencies need be characterized by less ‘rationality’ or ‘free choice’ 
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Simon’s juvenile experiences probably influenced the subsequent phases of his 
intellectual career, the change in his theoretical tools notwithstanding2, as one infers 
from this telling sentence: “I was (and am) a new Deal Democrat, probably imprinted 
by Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s inaugural address” (Simon, 1991b, p. 119). Hence, the 
following sections will discuss, among other things, how the theme of planning and 
centralization was dealt with in his mature thought. The thesis is that Simon’s idea of a 
decentralized planning was later brought into consonance with his theories on BR, 
organizations, and complex systems. 
 
 
2. Central Planning as a Decentralized System 
 
Two arguments are closely connected in Simon’s discourse on planning and the 
market: his criticism against “a priori” assumptions, and the role of BR. 
As regards the first concept, Simon always declared that he held an empirical view 
of science. This methodological approach, applied to the comparative analysis of 
planning and the market, appeared in embryonic terms in the above mentioned 
statement of 1941, and re-emerged over time.3 In particular, it plays a special role in 
Organizations (1958), where he argues that the relationship among BR, coordination, 
centralization and decentralization must be evaluated “in each case by reference to the 
empirical facts”, and not by “a priori” considerations. In fact, “imperfections” of both 
                                                                                                                                            
than the private revenue-expenditure process – albeit the institutional framework through which the 
rationality is achieved and the choice exercised may be very different in the two cases” (Simon, 1941, p. 
330). 
2 When in the mid-1950s Simon devoted large part of his research to artificial intelligence, his 
theoretical tools profoundly changed, and his analysis of decisional processes (especially in the form of 
problem solving) assumed a new form. On this topic, see Sent (2000). Augier (2000) argues for the 
continuity of Simon’s scientific interests throughout his scholarly life. In my view, there is continuity as 
regards the objects of Simon’s research, i.e., decision-making processes (also in terms of problem solving); 
yet the approach provided by artificial intelligence from the mid-1950s onwards brought drastic change to 
his treatment of decision-making. 
3 In fact, also in his mature work, Simon claims the need for empirical analysis (contrary to a priori 
assumptions): “great plan versus no plan debate hinges in considerable measure upon empirical 
propositions about how price mechanisms in fact operate: what costs they impose of information gathering 
and computing; how stably and rapidly they adjust the system to environmental changes.” (Simon, 1962b, 
p. 70). 
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the market (externalities) and the centralized systems (limits on information and of 
computation) produce disadvantages, which must be weighed and compared (March 
and Simon, 1993 [1958], p. 226).4 
According to Simon and March, this approach is not followed by Hayek, who 
moreover refers to BR to provide arguments in favour of the price mechanism, as 
appears in a long passage of The Road to Serfdom, which they quote. The logical 
conclusions of Hayek’s (“a priori”) argument, they say, is that the market mechanism is 
more advantageous than centralized systems the more that complex situations occur 
(since these are characterized by a large amount of dispersed information which cannot 
be collected by the central planner). Yet this hypothesis must be tested, and – they state 
- the best test is to consider a modern economy under wartime conditions, because the 
implicit assumption is economic systems are more complex in wartime than in 
peacetime. If this is so, since “under wartime conditions the pricing mechanism is 
partially displaced by central planning” (March and Simon, 1993 [1958], p. 227), then 
Hayek’s perspective is confuted. The basis of Simon’s reasoning is the work of Ely 
Devons: an “insightful” English economist who participated in the planning of aircraft 
production in Great Britain during World War II (Devons, 1950).5 There are a number 
of arguments to which the authors refer, drawing on Devons’ work, in order to explain 
why planning replaces the market in wartime conditions. One of them is that, when the 
“goal” is winning the war, the price mechanism encounters the difficulty of estimating 
“the marginal contribution of activities to the goals” (March and Simon, 1993 [1958], 
p. 229). Moreover, in the market “the information needed by individual decision 
makers to set marginal costs equal to prices is most easily accessible to those decision 
                                                
4 According to the authors “The fundamental theorems of welfare economics – both the classical 
one and Barone’s – assert that under certain circumstances the decentralized price mechanism will give as 
good a result as central planning; the theorems do not give us any positive reason for preferring the former 
to the latter” (March and Simon, 1993 [1958], p. 224). Note that Simon came to know Walras’ theory of 
general equilibrium through Henry Schultz’s lectures at the University of Chicago. Schultz’s successor was 
Oskar Lange, who also taught Simon (1991b, pp. 51-53). H. Schultz and H.L. Moore disseminated Pareto’s 
thought in the United States between the 1920s and 1930s, and O. Lange was a prominent participant in the 
debate on market socialism, his views being at least partially inspired by Pareto and Barone (see 
Marchionatti, 2006). 
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makers”, yet if this condition is not fulfilled, as happens in wartime economies, “the 
argument for decentralization and the argument for the price mechanism become 
separate and distinct” (March and Simon, 1993 [1958], p. 229), because the market is 
not the sole decentralized system, and others must be considered. More precisely, 
according to the authors, “decentralization without prices” (March and Simon, 1993 
[1958], p. 226) is possible. 
In short, by means of Devons’ analysis, Simon and March stress “some of 
deficiencies of the price mechanism for wartime decision-making” (March and Simon, 
1993 [1958], p. 229, emphasis added), show why some complex situations, which 
imply uncertainty and agents’ BR, cannot be resolved by the usual market processes, 
and they put forward the thesis that decentralization does not uniquely connote the 
market. 
In fact, the complexity characterizing certain specific contexts can only be 
adequately handled by means of a particular type of “planning”, which “involved many 
elements of decentralization, but using devices other than prices for coordination” 
(March and Simon, 1993 [1958], p. 229, emphasis added). Through Devons’ words, 
Simon and March point out that the centralization of decisions ensured the coordination 
of individual actions, but the difficulties of administration required the delegation of 
“decisions to separate, largely self-contained units of administration” (Devons quoted 
in March and Simon, 1993 [1958], p. 230; cf. Simon et al., 1955). This co-existence of 
planning and decentralization depends precisely on the presence of BR, because 
“planner” and administration are “inevitably” connoted by the boundedness of human 
capacities and cannot handle a huge amount of data. In particular, BR generates a 
process in which the search for a (“satisficing”) solution for a problem implies 
decomposition of the latter into sub-problems, which are more tractable by rationally 
limited agents, and the same procedure characterizes the action of administrations 
connoted by limited capacities (Devons quoted in March and Simon, 1993 [1958], p. 
230). In this way, by referring to Devons’ empirical analysis, it is possible to show how 
                                                                                                                                            
5 For analysis of the relations between Simon’s thought and the intellectual climate during and after 
World War II, in connection with the influence of cyborg science, see Sent (2000) and Mirowski (2002). A 
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BR enters the scene not as an argument in favour of the market, but as a fundamental 
element in explaining how decentralization works within planning.  
In short, given this framework, which reflects arguments put forward in previous 
works on administrative organization (cf. Simon, 1976 [1947], pp. 35-38 and 234-240): 
a) central planning involves the decentralization of decisions;  
b) this kind of decentralization derives from human BR. 
 
 
2.1 Central planning and firm’s planning: Homologies 
 
A fundamental point is that March’s and Simon’s analysis allows definition of the 
link between central planning and organizations, since central planning is nothing other 
than the result of decision-making by a specific organization: the administrative 
organization.6 Macro and micro-analysis are closely connected, and as a consequence 
March and Simon explain the light that “planning debate cast[s] on the decision making 
within individual firm” (March and Simon, 1993 [1958], p. 230). This perspective 
permits comparison between administrative and firm planning. An issue arises, 
however: within an organization subdivided into “sufficiently independent” 
departments (the analogues of administrative, separate, units), the internal use of prices 
is a useful mechanism for decentralized decision-making only when external 
economies are not present, and if decision-makers possess techniques with which to 
calculate marginal costs and returns, otherwise: 
 
“In the absence of such techniques, prices may not be an effective mechanism for decentralization. 
Hence, the movement toward decentralized decision-making within organizations cannot be limited to 
the internal use of prices.” (March and Simon, 1993 [1958], p. 231) 
 
                                                                                                                                            
more general treatment is in Edwards (1997). 
6 “‘Planning’, broadly defined, is of course indistinguishable from other kinds of decision-making” 
(March and Simon, 1993 [1958], p. 221; see pp. 44-48). 
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Moreover, the same need to break a problem down into more tractable sub-
problems, which imposes decentralization in central administration, operates in 
individual organizations, where sub-goals (i.e., types of sub-problems which require 
“satisficing” solutions) are assigned to organizational sub-units (March and Simon, 
1993 [1958], p. 173). 
In conclusion, planning in both firms and administration essentially involves 
organizational problems of the same kind, and it must be considered, in the light of 
organization theory, as a decentralized system (Goodin, 2004, pp. 236-237). In this 
sense, Simon and March are very far from conceptions of planning both traditional and 
probably inspired by a certain Walrasian tradition.7 In particular, socialist central 
planning, Simon later maintained, relies on the figure of the omniscient “designer” able 
to define all details of a plan, whilst social planning is an interactive process deriving 
from a myriad of decentralized decisions (see sect. 4). Thus “Marxist fundamentalists” 
are compared to “Christian fundamentalists”. These latter, in reaction to Darwin’s 
theory, conceived “no design without Designer”, the former “reacted in a similar way 
when, after World War I, they undertook to construct the new socialist economies of 
eastern Europe” (Simon, 1996 [1969], p. 34). 
 
 
3. The role of prices: Simon’s and Hayek’s views 
 
Simon’s and March’s discussion on the market and decentralized planning is 
obscure in some passages. Moreover, it is rather unclear why the best “test” for 
evaluating whether the price mechanism is more effective than planning should be 
analysis of an economic system under wartime conditions. Why should economics in 
wartime be considered more complex than in peacetime (i.e., arguments should be put 
forward in support of this thesis), and not as an exceptional circumstance? Is the Great 
                                                
7 “The picture (or perhaps, nightmare) of planning as the solution of almost unimaginable numbers 
of simultaneous equations can be replaced by a picture of planning as the construction of a series unrelated 
[or more appropriately ‘loosely coupled’] actions programs” (March and Simon, 1993 [1958], p. 197). 
10 
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Britain case in World War II really representative? Why not refer to other similar cases 
by means of comparative analysis coherently with their empirical approach? 
The assumption based solely on that kind of “test” is striking (and partially 
unconvincing). Yet, all this should be interpreted in light of Simon’s conviction (which 
he specified better with time) that the market, per se, does not always assure stability 
and rapid adjustments (Simon, 1962b, p. 70), and that in modern economies 
organizations perform a more relevant role of coordination than the price system does. 
In this sense, it is significant that, whilst Simon revised some of his works over time 
(e.g., Administrative Behavior, and The Sciences of the Artificial), he - with March – 
did not modify Organizations, whose “Second Edition” appeared in 1993, although in 
the new Introduction they specified which parts required new treatment thirty-five 
years later, without including the last sections of the work. 
All this probably explains why the arguments treated in the final pages of this book 
were resumed many years later in Simon (1991a) in a new context, which in Simon’s 
view allowed their generalization. In this well-known article, Simon once again 
summarizes Devons’ analysis, which is opposed to Hayek’s, and his thesis on the 
reasons for preferring central planning, in certain circumstances.8 He also points out 
that 
 
“Prices perform their informational function when they are known or reasonably predictable. 
Uncertain prices produced by unpredictable shifts in a system reduce the ability of actors to respond 
rationally”. (Simon, 1991a, p. 40; emphasis added) 
 
This statement reflects Simon’s general conviction that it is not only in wartime 
conditions that prices do not correctly perform their informational role because they are 
altered by the presence of externalities and of public goods (Simon, 1983, p. 76). More 
precisely, Simon recognizes that prices reduce, under specific conditions, the need of 
(rationally limited) individuals for information. Yet, if uncertainty on prices prevails, 
11 
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the market, instead of improving the individual capacity to make correct decisions, 
“reduce[s] the ability of actors to respond rationally”; and this view makes the 
difference with respect with other approaches. 
In particular, in both the neoclassical and Hayekian approaches, their basic 
theoretical differences notwithstanding, prices perform an important role in guiding 
individual choices. The market system is “a mechanism for communicating 
information” by prices (Hayek, 1945, p. 86), and these latter “serve […] as indicators 
of what ought to be done in the present circumstances”, because prices incorporate 
information (about technical efficiency, changes in the relative scarcities of “materials” 
and factors, etc.) and this function is “wholly the product of competition” (Hayek, 
1976, pp. 116-118). By contrast, Simon describes the consequences deriving from 
“uncertain prices”, which require recourse to “satisficing” procedures and a search for 
information not based on price signals. In fact, under these conditions prices cannot 
communicate reliable information: therefore the market, as a price mechanism, is 
neither the only nor, perhaps, the most important system of economic coordination, and 
others replace it (see sect. 5).9 Now, with respect to the analysis of Organizations, the 
alternative system which replaces the market is not an administrative central planning 
system, but the network of organizations (where, we have seen, the former and the 
latter share important characteristics). As a consequence, as we will see, the focus must 
be shifted to the role of organizations and their predominance in economic systems. In 
fact, “The economies of modern industrialized society can more appropriately be 
labelled organizational economies than market economies” (Simon, 1991a, p. 42). 
Markets are important mechanisms of coordination; yet they cannot fulfil their 
function if they do not possess “a high degree of economic stability and a low level of 
                                                                                                                                            
8 When “the qualifying conditions for stability of markets are not met, as, for example, in wartime, 
we see a rapid movement toward centralized planning as the preferred coordinating mechanism for many 
activities” (Simon, 2000, p. 751). 
9 Thomsen opposes Austrian (and Hayekian) market-process approach to Simon’s. In the former, the 
function of (disequilibrium) prices is to provide profit opportunity and stimulate competitive discovery, whilst 
for Simon prices merely summarize information that economizes on the computational limits of agents 
(Thomsen, 1992, p. 82; cf. Kirzner, 1984). The problem is that, for Simon, markets are rarely able to reduce 
the need for information and computation, owing to their instability and the presence of externalities. As a 
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externalities” (Simon, 2000, p. 751). Despite these problems, economists usually 
neglect consideration of how organizational procedures determine non-market 
coordination. In fact, coordination by means of “adjustment of quantities”, both among 
organizations and between them, often plays a more important role in the real world 
than do coordination and allocation by means of prices (Simon, 1991a, p. 40). 
Consequently, the function of the market as an allocation system based on price signals 
is, in certain circumstances, limited (see sects. 6-7). In particular, Simon stresses the 
differences with respect to Hayek’s approach, as follows: 
 
“In arguing for markets as mechanisms for simplifying choice, whittling it down to a size where 
human minds can deal with it, von Hayek undoubtedly exaggerates the role of prices as the only or chief 
coordinating device in markets […] when we regulate inventories, we do so largely by quantity 
responses rather than price responses. So perhaps von Hayek was wrong in giving price the very 
privileged place they occupy in his article [Hayek, 1945], but he was very right about what markets and 
economic exchanges are all about – how they make it possible for people of bounded rationality to make 
reasonable choices. So it is a complex picture. Bounded rationality appears very Austrian in some 
dimensions and very anti-Austrians in others.” (Simon et al., 1992, p. 27). 
 
In sum, between 1958 and 1992 Herbert A. Simon delineated a perspective in 
which BR is linked to non-market coordination.10 More precisely, BR was linked to a 
particular view of “planning” which differs profoundly from Hayek’s. All this defined 
a specific role for organizations. 
The analytical differences between Simon and Hayek can therefore be highlighted 
by referring to the concepts of planning and organization from a more general and 
theoretical perspective. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
consequence, “uncertain prices” neither communicate reliable information nor stimulate competitive discovery 
procedures. For this reason they are often replaced by other mechanisms of coordination. 
10 Simon points out that market, in some cases, does not provide an answer for either externalities or 
uncertainty. Negative externalities are often dealt with by “administrative answers”, instead of “answers given 
by an automatic market mechanism”. Moreover, “uncertainty calls flexibility, but markets do not always 
provide the greatest flexibility in the face of uncertainty. All depends on the sources of the uncertainty”, which 
13 
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4. Social planning, constructivism and spontaneous order: Hayek’s 
perspective 
 
Hayek’s criticism of social “planning” was based theoretically on a critique of the 
notion of “constructivism” or “rationalist constructivism”. According to this vision, 
Hayek maintained, human institutions emerge by deliberate design in order to 
accomplish human purposes (Hayek, 1946; 1952 [1941-1944]; 1960; 1967 [1965]; 
1978 [1970]; 1988). On Hayek’s view, this is an erroneous conception, which also has 
dangerous effects if it induces political, social and economic interventions. In fact, 
“designed theories […] lead directly to socialism” (Hayek, 1946, p. 10);11 therefore 
constructivist ideologies constitute a serious threat to Western civilization12. 
Hayek opposed the “spontaneous order” explanation of the emergence of 
institutions (the market included) against constructivist theories. According to the 
“spontaneous order” theory, complexes of practices or rules of conduct “prevailed 
because they made a group of men successful” (Hayek, 1973, p. 17), and they “were 
preserved because they enabled the group in which they had arisen to prevail over 
others” (Hayek, 1973, p. 9). These rules arose spontaneously, and they were 
unintentionally selected for their advantages. Therefore, the unintentional order of 
society was explained by resorting to the notion of cultural selection. This evolutionary 
process had connoted Western societies and their institutions (in particular, the market), 
and it was characterized by “abstract” and non-coercive rules (cf. Hayek, 1967a, p. 72). 
In short, according to Hayek, “constructivism” led to the application of social 
planning because it assumed that the “engineering” mind of the legislator could 
deliberately create a social order. By contrast, the “spontaneous order” explanation 
                                                                                                                                            
determines whether resorting to organizations rather than the market is prefererable (Simon, 1996 [1969], pp. 
42-43). 
11"It is from this kind of social rationalism or constructivism that all modern socialism, planning and 
totalitarianism derives" (Hayek, 1967 [1965], p. 85; cf. pp. 91-95).  
12 "We are not far from the point where the deliberately organized forces of society may destroy those 
spontaneous forces which have made advance possible" (Hayek, 1960, p. 38). See also Hayek (1967 [1965], p. 
94). 
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postulated that the social order emerged by virtue of evolutionary, unintentional, 
processes. Consequently, these theoretical approaches represented a clear, conceptual, 
dichotomy. 
 
 
5. Simon and social planning as an interactive process13 
 
Hayek’s dichotomy between constructivism and spontaneous order could not be 
accepted by Simon, whose general assumption was that both natural and artificial 
systems exhibit adaptive and evolutionary features (Simon, 1996 [1969], pp. 6 and 
149), where artificial systems include human institutions created for specific purposes.  
In this perspective, it is possible to analyze the relation between society as a social 
“client” and a (social) planner. In fact, the planning of changes (for example, in a town) 
engenders a number of unintended changes which cannot be foreseen by the original 
plan, since the latter exerts its direct influence only on a finite domain. In other words, 
fulfilment of the plan produces unintended results. Moreover, the thesis that artificial 
and natural (biological) systems exhibit similar features enables their examination in 
terms of dynamic, evolutionary, processes. In fact, “society as client”, and social 
institutions as the planners exhibit a peculiar interaction: 
 
“The members of an organization or a society for whom plans are made are not passive instruments, 
but are themselves designers who are seeking to use the system to further their own goals […]. A not 
dissimilar representation of the social planning process views it as a game between the planners and 
those whose behavior they seek to influence. The planners make their move (i.e., implement their 
design), and those who are affected by it then alter their own behavior to achieve their goals in the 
changed environment.” (Simon, 1996 [1969], pp. 153-154; emphasis added. Cf. Simon, 1961, pp. 189-
190). 
 
Since bounded rationality characterizes every decision-maker, neither individuals 
nor institutions can mould society by means of social planning able to define in every 
15 
 15 
detail its present and future configuration. Rather, a continuous interaction between 
different designers occurs, since the “society as client” is itself, in turn, a planner. As a 
consequence, this process is describable in terms of “social planning without fixed 
goals” (Simon, 1996 [1969], p. 165), and every step in the interaction constitutes a new 
base for the emergence of new plans. 
 
“It is also beside the point to ask whether the later stages of the development were consistent with 
the initial one - whether the original designs were realized. Each step of implementation created a new 
situation; and the new situation provided a starting point for fresh design activity." (Simon, 1996 [1969], 
p. 163). 
 
Contrary to Hayek’s notion of constructivism, as static planning able to “block the 
future progress” (Hayek, 1997 [1944], p. 152) (that is, evolutionary, spontaneous, 
processes), new purposes and new social configurations emerge purely from a dynamic 
interaction among different plans, which can be interpreted as an adaptive and creative 
response to environment changes. For this reason, society is an “evolving artifact” 
(Simon, 1996 [1969], p. 139), and social planning is an endless process able to 
engender unintentional outcomes (Simon, 1996 [1969], pp. 165-166). Finally, it should 
be pointed out that this kind of analysis implies that agents adopt procedural rationality 
in order to solve new problems generated by a changing environment which require 
them constantly to “alter their own behavior to achieve their goals”. In spite of the 
diverse analytical contexts, Simon’s and Hayek's treatments of the notion of social 
planning can be compared. 
In Hayek's theory, institutional interventions are admissible only if they are 
consistent with spontaneous, evolutionary, processes (Hayek, 1973, pp. 45-46; cf. 
Ioannides, 2003, p. 541); otherwise they must be considered constructivist, dangerous, 
acts.14 By contrast, for Simon, social planning is a coherent part of endless and 
unintentional processes, and not the consequence of constructivist mentality.  
                                                                                                                                            
13 The arguments of this section are treated more extensively in …PAPER OF THE AUTHOR.  
14 “The principle of rule of law” is what determines the legitimacy of state action; yet what 
institutions can do to improve spontaneous order, that is, a designing intervention, is only “somewhat 
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Note that Simon and Hayek share the conviction that no (individual or 
institutional) mind possesses both complete information and perfect foresight (March 
and Simon, 1993 [1958], pp. 225-226; Simon, 1996 [1969], p. 34). Yet, the analysis of 
the action of BR leads these authors to different conclusions. On the one hand, for 
Hayek, planning and deliberately organized forces “may destroy” spontaneous, 
evolutionary, orders (Hayek, 1960, p. 38). Therefore, the planner’s fixed goals matter. 
On the other hand, according to Simon, it is precisely the BR of the institutional 
planner (the possibility to control only few variables of its plan) that permits both 
interaction with other decision-makers and the continuous modification of the original 
plan. Therefore, the planner’s fixed aims may have a marginal role. As a consequence, 
Hayek's radical distinction between constructivism (planning) and evolutionism breaks 
down and, contrary to Hayek, Simon’s limited information and BR provide the 
explanatory key for the representation of deliberate, institutional, interventions in 
evolutionary terms15. Finally, this is also coherent with the image of the bounded 
rationality of administration in wartime, where, in Devons’ words, the larger the basis 
involved in central decisions, “the fewer [are] the relationships that can taken into 
account” (Devons quoted in March and Simon 1993 [1958], p. 231). Therefore, on 
connecting the statements of Organizations and The Sciences of the Artificial, it 
emerges that central planning not only requires forms of decentralization in both 
administration and firms but also generates unintended outcomes, because 
decentralized choices by decisional units (the “members of an organization or a 
society”) cannot be entirely directed by decisional centres. 16 
                                                                                                                                            
obliquely” suggested by Hayek (Barry, 1979, pp. 105-123). Also Vanberg (1994, chaps. 5 and 6) asks 
which rules (and which criteria) could be considered suitable for improving the market mechanism, and in 
his view Hayek’s arguments are “somewhat ambiguous” as regards the desiderability of rules (p. 102). This 
leads to the constitutional political economy approach, which addresses the problem of how to 
appropriately design and modify rules and institutions, sometimes seeking convergence with Hayekian 
perspective. This convergence is possible, according to Caldwell (2003, pp. 358-359), although he 
recognizes that Hayek is “ambivalent” about the problem of conceiving designs for general rules of 
society. 
15 Adaptive systems, forged by evolution, are connoted by homeostatic and feedback mechanisms 
and production of variety. Given these peculiarities, “Social planning without fixed goals has much in 
common with the processes of biological evolution” (Simon 1996 [1969], p. 165). 
16 Thomsen criticizes Simon on the ground that the BR approach implies that the planner could 
operate with more success than the market if he was able to master complexity, i.e., if the number of 
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6. Markets and organizations: Simon’s and Hayek’s general views 
 
Simon’s and Hayek’s approaches display profound differences in their definitions 
of the role of markets and organizations. For Hayek, the latter are characterized by 
opposite rules, although organizations are integrated into the market system. By 
contrast, in Simon’s work, the boundaries between these mechanisms of coordination 
are not always well defined. More in general, according to Hayek, the market, as a 
spontaneous order, is the fundamental structure for coordinating individual decisions 
and providing “relevant information” to agents, whereas in Simon’s view, a plurality of 
coordination systems characterize modern economies, and among them organizations 
play a distinctive role. 
Hayek clarifies this point as follows: 
 
“What distinguish the rules which will govern action within an organization is that they must be 
rules for the performance of assigned tasks. They presuppose that the place of each individual in a fixed 
structure is determined by command and that the rules each individual must obey depend on the place 
which he has been assigned and on the particular ends which have been indicated for him by the 
commanding authority.” (Hayek, 1973, p. 49; emphasis added). 
 
Moreover, the term “economy” must be applied to the planned activity of 
organizations, as opposed to that of “market order” (Hayek, 1976, p. 107). Therefore, if 
an economic system is treated as an organization which pursues specific ends, the 
outcome is similar to that represented by central planning. In fact,  
 
                                                                                                                                            
variables did not exceed his computational limits (Thomsen, 1992, p. 81). However, this hypothesis fails to 
consider that, for Simon, social planning is an interactive, decentralized, process (and not a static state), 
which cannot be governed by any designing mind. On the one hand, planning is sometimes empirically 
more efficacious than the market; on the other, it involves complex processes which cannot normally be 
directed by a rationally limited legislator. 
18 
 18 
“whenever we speak of the economy of a country, or of the world, we are employing a term which 
suggests that these systems ought to be run on socialist lines and directed according to a single plan so as 
to serve a unitary system of ends.” (Hayek, 1976, p. 108) 
 
“By contrast, the rules governing a spontaneous order [for example, the market], 
must be independent of purpose” (Hayek, 1973, p. 50).  
The opposition between the “abstract rules” of spontaneous orders and the specific 
“commands” of organizations is a fundamental distinction for Hayek, and the problem 
of how organizations can be integrated without frictions in the market’s spontaneous 
order requires additional explanation. Langlois, for example, maintains that 
organizations (firms) and markets are both systems of rules of conduct; they are made 
of the same “stuff”, namely capabilities; and they are characterized by individuals who 
pursue specific goals. In particular, firms’ performances are connoted by unintended 
outcomes. Hence Hayek’s spontaneous order can include “extramarket forms” because 
the distinction between order and organizations is “a matter of degree” (Langlois, 1992; 
1995). Foss (1997) emphasizes that firms are “cognitive entities”, although he points 
out the difficulty of finding a precise boundary between spontaneous and planned 
orders (Foss, 1994, p. 40). Ioannides points out that the consequences of Hayek’s 
discourse make it possible to consider business firms in terms of process, consistently 
with an evolutionary approach. In fact, commands in organizations prevail when they 
are connoted by a limited amount of complexity. Yet, if complexity and abstractness 
increase, then organizations tend to be governed by rules, and not by commands. More 
precisely, commands tend to assume generality “thus blurring the distinction between 
rules and commands” (Ioannides, 2003, p. 556). 
In general, attention is focused on the role of knowledge (and tacit knowledge), 
the use of which implies that firms partially work as a spontaneous order. This 
perspective, in my view, is coherent when Hayek considers the firm as an individual 
(that is, a whole, an indivisible entity)17, because coordination among organizations (as 
                                                
17 “What in fact we find in all free societies is that, although groups of men will join in organizations 
for the achievement of some particular ends, the co-ordination of the activities of all these separate 
organizations, as well as of the separate individuals, is brought about by the forces making for a spontaneous 
19 
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among individuals) emerges in terms of spontaneous order. Hayek, like Simon, 
recognizes the increasing role of organizations in modern economies, but – contrary to 
Simon - he does not envisage them as replacing the market. In particular, he maintains 
that the more the spontaneous order extends, the more “its elements will not be 
economies of individuals, but of such organizations as firms and associations, as well 
as of administrative bodies” (Hayek, 1988, p. 37). This perspective does not modify the 
general assumption, according to which these types of “more comprehensive deliberate 
organisation” are subsumed within the market, spontaneous, order. In fact, individuals 
and organizations can be associated as intentional actors which essentially differ only 
in their size, and: “as the overall spontaneous order expands, so the sizes of the units of 
which it consists grow” (Hayek, 1988, p. 37). But this point of view does not consider 
the internal structure of organization, which implies hierarchies, division of labour and 
the coexistence of general instructions and specific commands. This latter view implies 
that organizations should be examined more as multi-dimensional structures than as 
unitary, or indivisible, entities (see Fiori, 2000; Bensaïd, 2002, pp. 162-163). In short, 
on the one hand, Hayek suggests that the more an organization is governed by general 
rules and refers to the tacit and dispersed knowledge of its members, the more it 
improves its coordination, since its functioning is closer to that of spontaneous order.18 
On the other hand, an organization – considered from the point of view of its internal 
configuration - is prevalently connoted by “specific commands”, “unitary hierarchy of 
ends”, and “fixed structures”, that is, characteristics which oppose organizations 
against spontaneous order (cf. Garrouste, 2002). Therefore, elaborating an evolutionary 
theory of organization on the basis of Hayek’s theory means setting aside this 
dichotomy and formulating a new perspective which “‘extract[s]’ some insights from 
his analysis” (Ioannides, 2003, p. 534). In other words, Hayek’s work comprises an 
                                                                                                                                            
order.” (Hayek, 1973, p. 46, emphasis added). “Many of the individual and unique features of a particular 
corporation which make for its success are of the same character as the similar features of an individual 
person” (Hayek, 1967 [1959], p. 288). 
18 “To some extent every organization must rely also on rules and not only on specific commands. The 
reason here is the same as that which makes it necessary for a spontaneous order to rely solely on rules: 
namely that by guiding the actions of individuals by rules rather than specific commands it is possible to make 
use of knowledge which nobody possesses as a whole” (Hayek, 1973, pp. 48-49). Note that all this occurs only 
“to some extent”. Cf. Langlois (1995, p. 258). 
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evolutionary view of neither firms nor central planning, whose general characteristics 
reflect those of organizations at a different level (hence, as previously pointed out, the 
opposition between the conceptions of economic systems as “economies” structured 
analogously to organizations, and as “spontaneous orders”). In fact, Hayek does not 
explain whether (and eventually how) constructivist orders evolve (cf. AUTHOR’S 
PAPER). 
By way of contrast, the dichotomy between order and organizations does not apply 
to Simon’s approach. In particular, two arguments should be considered when 
comparing between the two authors: the notion of authority and the structure of 
decision-making within organizations. 
In A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship (1951), Simon developed 
some concepts dealt with in Administrative Behavior (1947, ch. 7) to show the 
advantages of an employment contract with respect to other forms of contracts (sales 
contract). The authority relationship between an employer and an employee does not 
consist – as it does for Hayek (1973, pp. 48-49) – in a set of “specific commands” 
imposed by the “commanding authority” to fulfil “assigned tasks”, although general 
rules sometimes can replace and/or moderate the use of precise commands. Rather, for 
Simon, the authority of the employer takes shape when the employee agrees to perform 
a range of actions, not previously specified in every detail, within an “area of 
acceptance”. In short, the employee agrees to undertake some tasks that will be chosen 
by the employer, since the possible behaviours that will be requested are indifferent for 
him/her. As a consequence, this kind of incomplete contract reduces the employer’s 
uncertainty as regards the employees’ future behaviours, with minimal cost for the 
latter. This advantage furnishes an answer (at least partial), to a recurrent question: 
“Why is so much of the world’s work performed in large, hierarchic organizations?” 
(Simon, 1979, p. 502). 
Yet the notions of authority and of hierarchy exhibit other characteristics (see sect. 
7), which were better defined after Simon (1951), and are connected to the view of 
decisional structure of organizations. 
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In fact, for Simon, more radically than in Hayek, an organization is defined by 
flexibility, changeable strategies, adaptive capabilities and responses, rather than by 
fulfilment of detailed plans: “Behavior in the organization is not determined in advance 
and once for all by a detailed blueprint and schedule” (March and Simon 1993 [1958], 
p. 45). Moreover, programs are essentially strategies to establish general courses of 
action, not “commands” (cf. Simon, 1991a, p. 32). “The term ‘program’ is not intended 
to connote complete rigidity. The content of the program may be adaptive to a large 
number of characteristics of the stimulus that initiates it” (March and Simon 1993 
[1958], p. 163). In this context, a special role is played by the discretionary behaviours 
of members of organization, because “discretion”, amongst other things, means that “A 
program may specify only general goals, and leave unspecified the exact activities to 
be used in reaching them” (March and Simon 1993 [1958], p. 170; cf. pp. 211-212). 
Therefore: “Organizations are not highly centralized structures in which all the 
important decisions are made at the center”, and as in the market, their “decision 
processes are substantially decentralized” (Simon, 1996 [1969], p. 41).19 In short, 
firstly, the focal point is “to delegate within guidelines”, that is, define an intermediate 
point between absolute discretion of members and authority’s absolute power in 
making decisions (Simon, 1991a, p. 32). Secondly, such large decentralization in 
organizations is a condition for firms’ evolution, in that a number of novelties arise 
from the complex networks of decisional processes which characterize it, and as a 
consequence of organizational near-decomposability, i.e., the condition whereby 
departments of organizations exhibit a certain degree of independence which generates 
unforeseen changes in the aggregate (see sect. 7). 
In conclusion, both firms and social planning, for Hayek - given their similar 
structures - are essentially connoted by centralization and vertical hierarchies. By 
                                                
19 In the “Introductions” to the Second Edition (1957) and to the Third Edition (1976) of Administrative 
Behavior, Simon writes: “Discussion of administrative centralization and decentralization often bog down on 
the question: ‘Who really makes the decisions?’ Such a question is meaningless – a complex decision is like a 
great river, drawing from its many tributaries the innumerable component premises of which it is constituted. 
Many individuals and organization units contribute to every large decision, and the problem of centralization 
and decentralization is a problem of arranging this complex system into an effective scheme” (Simon, 1957 
[1947], p. xii; Simon, 1976 [1947], p. xii). 
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contrast, for Simon they are largely characterized by decentralization compatible with 
vertical hierarchies which operate more by strategies than by specific commands (as his 
theory of complexity shows).  
 
 
6.1 Economic systems as “organizational economies”: the Simon’s challenge 
 
As shown in sections 2 and 3, a distinctive perspective, based on the coordinating 
role of organizations in modern economies, emerges in Simon’s work, since it directly 
challenges the theories which consider the market as the only (or prevalent) mechanism 
able to connect decentralized decisions.  
Simon’s vision can be summarized as follows: 
1) Markets perform important coordination functions among economic subjects, 
yet they are “only one […] among the spectrum of mechanisms of coordination” For 
example, some coordination mechanisms are based on statistics, bargaining, 
negotiation, hierarchic organizations, adjustment of quantities, etc., and their mix 
characterizes different cultures and societies (Simon, 1996 [1969], p. 31). In particular, 
“[a] large part of the behavior of the system now takes place inside the skins of firms, 
and does not consist just of market exchange” (Simon, 1991a, p. 25). 
More specifically, the economic units in capitalist societies are prevalently 
hierarchical organizations, and most of human economic activity “takes place in the 
internal environments of business and other organizations and not in the external, 
between-organization environments of market” (Simon, 1996 [1969], p. 31). Therefore, 
Simon suggests, the modern economies of industrialized societies should be described 
in terms of “organizational economies” instead of “market economies” (Simon, 1991a, 
p. 42), because “all economic activities are not left to market forces” (Simon, 1996 
[1969], p. 35; see Simon et al., 1992, p. 6). 
2) The boundary between markets and organizations is movable; it is determined 
by “rather subtle forces”; and it “varies greatly from one society to another and from 
one time to another” (Simon, 1991a, pp. 41 and 29; 1996 [1969], pp. 31 and 40); 
23 
 23 
3) The prevalence of organizational economies with respect to the market is 
explained in historical terms as a process that leads from the latter to the former, in that 
“when Adam Smith was writing, markets dominated the economy of Britain, but in the 
two succeeding centuries markets have been steadily and rapidly displaced by large 
organizations” (Simon, 2005, p. xii; cfr. Simon, 2000, p. 751; Augier e Simon, 2003, p. 
40). 
Finally, in 1958, Simon judged the relation that Hayek established between BR and 
(market) complexity to be right in some respects, but incomplete. Hayek’s approach, 
according to which BR prevalently acts the more information is dispersed in the 
market, grasped only a part of the problem. Hayek, in his mature works, confirmed this 
view, pointing out that organizations, contrary to the market, are less complex entities, 
In fact, if the “limited resources” of an organization are known to the organizer, they 
can be managed for specific ends, and consequently organization is not a complex 
system.20 More explicitly, organizations are “made orders”, and “Such orders are 
relatively simple or at least necessarily confined to such moderate degrees of 
complexity as the maker can still survey” (Hayek, 1973, p. 38). By contrast, according 
to Simon, not only the market, but also organizations exhibit high levels of complexity 
which cannot normally be mastered by the organizer’s bounded rationality, since, 
within organizations, “the ‘real’ situation is almost always far too complex to be 
handled in detail” (March and Simon 1993 [1958], p. 171).  
 
 
7. Organizations and decentralization in light of the complexity approach 
 
Simon’s view of the nature of organizations (as decentralized systems) also 
emerges in light of his explanation of complexity. 
                                                
20 “Where it is a question of using limited resources known to the organizer in the service of a unitary 
hierarchy of ends, an arrangement of organization (taxis) will be the more effective method. But where the 
task involves using knowledge dispersed among and accessible only to thousands or millions of separate 
individuals, the use of spontaneous ordering forces (cosmos) will be superior.” (Hayek, 1978 [1968], p. 76). 
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As previously shown, for Simon the distinction of boundaries between the market 
and organizations is a problematic issue. Every economic system exhibits a mix of 
planned and unplanned activities, which depends on the empirical features of those 
systems – as the socialist and capitalist experiences showed (Simon, 1996 [1969], p. 
31). Moreover, the nature of boundaries between the market and organizations should 
be explained by referring to the notions of “hierarchy” and “near decomposability”, 
which in turn define the “architecture of complexity”: 
 
“By a hierarchic system, or hierarchy, I mean a system that is composed of interrelated subsystems, 
each of the latter being, in turn, hierarchic in structure until we reach some lowest level of elementary 
subsystem.” (Simon, 1962a, p. 4) 
 
This definition does not contradict the usual meaning of the term “hierarchy”, 
which implies vertical authority relations; rather, it has different, theoretical, 
implications. In fact, the concept of “hierarchy” is also described in terms of “Chinese 
boxes”, which “usually consists of a box enclosing a second box, which, in turn, 
encloses a third” (Simon 1973, p. 5), and so on, and this does not imply relations of 
subordination among the parts (the metaphorical boxes). This notion leads to a broad 
vision of the “architecture of complexity”, both in nature and in social structures, and 
in this context an explicit reference to organizations (which are hierarchies) appears, as 
in the following long quotation from the “Introduction to the Second Edition” (1993) of 
Organizations: 
 
“Most of the organizations with which we deal are conventionally seen as hierarchies […] 
Hierarchy has two, nearly independent, aspects. First, it refers to the boxes-within-boxes [that is, 
“Chinese boxes”] structure that characterizes most organizations, with generally more intensive 
communication within boxes at any level than between different boxes at that level. Second, hierarchy 
refers to the common pyramidal arrangement of formal authority relations, stepwise from “top” to the 
“bottom” of an organization. 
The boxes-within-boxes character of hierarchy permits specialization of sub-units, keeping within 
bounds the amount of interaction and coordination among sub-units that is needed. At the same time, 
hierarchy facilitates the use of formal authority as a directing and coordinating mechanism. 
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Organizational processes are, however, not consistently hierarchical. They also involve networks of 
other types. They include flows of influence and control that go up and sideways as well as down. They 
reflect ecologies of interconnecting activities within which simple ideas of linear causal order and power 
are hard to sustain. They defy sharp definitions of organizational boundaries.” (March and Simon, 1993 
[1958], p. 3).  
 
The next step is to describe the “evolution” of complex systems. The concept is 
exemplified by the parable of two watchmakers, Tempus and Hora, whose work was 
constantly interrupted. The watches of both artisans comprised 1000 components. On 
each interruption Tempus put down the partly assembled component, which 
immediately disintegrated. On the contrary, Hora  
 
“had designed [his watches] so that he could put together subassemblies of about ten elements each. 
Ten of these subassemblies, again, could be put together into a larger subassembly; and a system of ten 
of the latter subassemblies constituted the whole watch” (Simon, 1962a, p. 7, see Simon, 1973, p. 7).  
 
In this way, Hora produced many more watches than Tempus. The basic idea is 
that this astounding result is achieved by the generation of layers of stable component 
subsystems, although the watches of both craftsmen have the same number of 
components. In short, Hora’s watches are hierarchic complex systems, while Tempus’ 
watches are not (Simon, 2002a, p. 591). Therefore, the conclusion is that “The time 
required for the evolution of a complex form from simple elements depends critically 
on the numbers and distribution of potential intermediate stable forms” (Simon, 1962a, 
p. 7; emphasis added). 
This rule is general in nature, and it characterizes physical, social, political, and 
symbolic systems. It also involves biological evolution, where the existence of 
“intermediate stable forms” strongly influences the evolution of complex organic 
forms, since these act as building blocks for further construction (Simon, 1962a; 1973, 
pp. 11-19). From this perspective, the evolution of systems and their stability are 
closely related. In fact, if an intermediate (near independent) structure exhibits a greater 
adaptive capacity, it will improve the general efficiency, probably without requiring 
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change in the entire aggregate. This concept is represented by means of a biological 
example. 
 
“Thinking of the evolution of organs as a problem in design, designing each organ to adapt to 
changing requirements will be much easier if the design of any one organ has little effect on the 
efficiency of the others; if the heart can be designed without redesigning the lungs, for instance” (Simon, 
2000, p. 753). 
 
Hence, complex systems are genuinely path-dependent, in that the history of their 
organizational structures matters. Moreover these latter at the same time confer 
stability on the system, and constitute the basis for the next evolutionary phases.21 This 
process is not teleological, in that complex forms randomly derive from the simpler 
ones, and the direction of change is consequently unpredictable, where stability is only 
a condition for survival. This property, which facilitates more rapid adaptation to a 
changing environment and characterizes stable and approximately independent 
structures, refers to the principle of “near-decomposability”, which is explained as 
follows: 
 
“In hierarchic systems, we can distinguish between the interactions among subsystems, on the one 
hand, and the interactions within subsystems – i.e., among the parts of those subsystems – on the other” 
(Simon, 1962a, p. 11) 
 
In a formal organization, Simon states, there is generally more interaction between 
two employees in the same department than between two employees in different 
departments.22 In short, a theory of nearly decomposable systems implies that 
“interactions among the subsystems are weak, but not negligible”, and shows that, in 
the short-run, the behaviour of each element of a system is approximately independent, 
                                                
21 Nonetheless, according to Agre (2003, p. 417), “very little biological structure above the cellular level is 
assembled from previously independent modular components [and] [t]he modern corporation did not 
acquire most of its hierarchical structure by assembling existing components; rather, its leaders discovered 
through trial and error the need to impose such structures on it”. 
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while in the long-run it depends in “an aggregate way” on the behaviour of the other 
components (Simon, 1962a, p. 11). These characteristics are illustrated by the example 
of a building with thermal insulation against the external environment. The building is 
divided into a certain number of rooms (the subsystems), the walls of which constitute 
the boundaries of the main subsystems, and in turn each room is divided into cubicles 
with poor insulation. The initial, wide, thermal difference among the cubicles, and from 
room to room will gradually disappear; in particular it will be reduced first among the 
cubicles, and subsequently among rooms. This perspective also refers to organizations, 
since “departmental boundaries play very much the same role as the walls in our heat 
example” (Simon, 1962a, p. 13).  
We can now re-examine the above metaphor of organizations as “Chinese boxes”: 
1) organizations generally exhibit “more intensive communication within boxes at 
any level than between different boxes at that level” (March and Simon, 1993 [1958], 
p. 3), and each department is sufficiently independent; 
2) hierarchy of organizations implies the formation of “sub-units” (that is, 
subsystems) which interact with each other (like the cubicles and the rooms in the 
building-complex system), although formal authority remains and performs a 
coordination function, defining more general aims than specific commands (cf. Simon, 
2002b, p. 612); 
3) organizations are not only connoted by vertical hierarchies; they also exhibit 
different kinds of networks. Therefore, they “defy sharp definitions of organizational 
boundaries.” (March and Simon, 1993 [1958], p. 3). More precisely, organization is a 
metaphorical box related to other boxes, and inside each box the boundaries are 
movable. Therefore, at different levels, the complex relation between the independence 
and dependence of these structures is reproduced. 
                                                                                                                                            
22 Other examples are made, for example, Simon considers molecular and intermolecular forces, that is, 
interactions “within” and “among” molecules. 
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In short, organizations are hierarchic, nearly-decomposable, structures, and share 
the properties of complex systems (Simon 2002a; 2002b).23 They have both a central 
decisional authority, and near independent sub-units, the components of which 
intensively interact within them, while interactions among the sub-units of the 
organizational aggregate are less intensive. Moreover, organizations are decentralized 
systems in which many important decisions are not made by top management (Simon, 
1996 [1969], p. 41). 
The lack of “sharp definitions of organizational boundaries” gives rise to an obvious 
problem: the relations between organizations and the market. The mechanism based on 
near-decomposability hierarchies must be applied in this case as well. In this 
perspective, an economic, complex, system appears prevalently as an aggregate 
composed of “intermediate stable forms” (organizations), which in their turn are 
divided into nearly independent sub-units. Markets do not disappear, rather “they are 
part of a wider framework of social institutions” (Simon, 1983, p. 76), especially 
organizations. As a consequence, economies must be conceived in terms of action of 
two systems, whose properties differ in that organizations, and the system which 
connect them as a network, exhibit near decomposability, whilst markets do not. In 
fact, “Markets are basically simple systems” (Simon, 2005, p. xii), i.e., perfectly 
decomposable structures which connect individual, independent, units (Augier, Simon, 
2003, p. 40). Yet, when Simon depicts the relations among firms as if they were 
observed by an imaginary “visitor from Mars”, he stresses that firms (“large green 
areas”) are interconnected by “market transactions” (“red lines”) (Simon, 1991a, p. 
27). This perspective delineates a conceptual problem, since relations among 
organizations (interpreted in light of near decomposability as “interactions among 
subsystems” - whereas the entire economic structure is the system) are now described 
in terms of “market transactions”. This view implies that the market should be 
considered as a coherent part of a complex (near decomposable) system, whose 
function is to connect stable, near decomposable, structures (firms). In short, this 
                                                
23 Among the various contributions which have developed analysis of organizations in the Simonian 
sense, in general and as complex systems, see Egidi (1992); Sanchez and Mahoney (1996); Grant, 1996; 
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perspective mirrors the notion of non-vertical hierarchy (the Chinese boxes), according 
to which the components of a complex system are not wholly independent one from the 
other but only nearly independent (Augier, Simon, 2003, p. 38). 
As a consequence, the market seems to assume a double connotation: when it refers 
to organizations relationships, it is part of a near decomposable large system; when it 
coordinates individual components, it is a perfectly decomposable, non complex, 
system.24 And, as we have seen, this issue derives from a historical process whereby the 
role of markets (in classical sense) has become increasingly residual with respect to 
that of organizations.25 
Finally, given this framework, the role of individuals is an essential point in the 
theory. On the one hand, agents are considered independent units in the context of the 
market (in the classical sense, for example, when they react to price signals), on the 
other hand, they are not the basic units for the coordination of complex systems; rather, 
the “intermediate stable forms” (organizations) accomplish this role and constitute the 
framework in which individual behaviour unfolds. An agent acts in social contexts, and 
this determines his preferences, beliefs, wants, identity and ideas (March and Simon, 
1993 [1958], p. 13): he is (and “must be”) “organized and institutionalized”, and “must 
in his decisions be subject to the influence of the organized group in which he 
participates” (Simon, 1976 [1947], p. 102; cf. p. 109; Simon 1957 [1947], p. xv; Simon 
1957, p. 196).  
In other words, individuals are “institutionalized” by means of organizations, 
because their subjectivity and their capacity for problem solving, given their BR, 
                                                                                                                                            
Frenken et al. (1999); Marengo and Dosi (2005). 
24 The market works when coordination among separate components does not require any “design”; 
if this is not so “the effectiveness of each component depends on the design of the other [and] we cannot 
depend on a pure market to bring about the desired coordination” (Augier, Simon, 2003, p. 41). 
25 Simon’s analysis of the market appears to be rather limited, and prevalently conducted in terms of 
comparison with organizations. Yet, the question of why some decisional problems are solved by 
organizations instead of the market is not left answered (cf. Heukelom, 2006, p. 17). In fact, Simon repeatedly 
maintains that organizations prevalently reduce the costs of coordination better than the market, and in any 
case “The choice between organization and markets depends on a comparison of these costs” (Augier and 
Simon, 2003, p. 41). As is well-known, a similar question, as regards the reasons for the existence of 
organizations, was posed by Coase in The Nature of the Firm (1937). Yet, assuming Simon’s perspective, the 
nature of problem could be reversed, asking why markets exist. Evidently, the answer is always grounded on 
the same empirical view, i.e., to identify when market coordination costs are inferior to those of organizations.  
30 
 30 
assumes a social form within organizations. This points out a further difference with 
respect to Hayek’s approach, where the institutionalization of agents is accomplished 
by means of shared, general, rules of conduct arising from the cultural selection process 
to which actors’ behaviours adhere. Therefore, the “institutionalization” of individuals 
is achieved in terms of a direct relation between agents and (social and market) order, 
because individuals following abstract rules generate spontaneous orders, and these 
latter in their turn influence their conduct (Hayek, 1967a, p. 76; cf. Lange-von Kulessa, 
1997, p. 278)26, while organizations do not play any special role in this process.27 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this paper I have tried to show that Simon’s and Hayek’s works diverge in some 
important respects, although interesting similarities can be found (Rizzello, 1999; 
Bourgine, 2004; Egidi and Marengo 2004), and Simon himself recognized some merit 
in the Austrian economist’s theory.  
Yet the analysis has also pointed out Simon’s distinctive view of planning as a 
decentralized mechanism which rejects both the “simple faith” on socialist central 
planning, and on the market (Simon, 1996 [1969], p. 34). His approach developed 
coherently over time, although it is more a set of connected concepts than a systematic 
theory. Nonetheless this relation exists. The issue is that planning is represented as an 
organizational problem (in both firms, and central administration), and exhibits a 
decentralized structure. Decentralization also characterizes the dynamic dimension of 
planning, because agents’ decisions continuously modify the original, central, plan. 
Finally, decentralization characterizes complex systems (including economic ones), 
since hierarchy and near-decomposability impose a structure of near-independent units 
                                                
26 There is a huge body of literature on this topic, especially as regards the relation between group 
selection theory and methodological individualism. On this debate, and for references, see Hodgson (1993) 
and Caldwell (2000). 
27 One notes in passing that all this delineates two perspectives on the causes of stability in 
economic systems: in one case, stability is determined by means of “intermediate stable forms” 
(organizations), in the other, it emerges because individuals’ behaviours refer to shared rules. 
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(organizations and their sub-units), which connotes economic systems as more 
organizational than market mechanisms, and constitutes conditions for the evolution of 
the aggregate. 
All this clearly emerges from comparison with Hayek’s theory (see table 1). In 
fact, analysis of British planning during World War II shows the different views of 
these authors on BR, planning, and the market. For Simon, contrary to Hayek, the 
notion of BR does not necessarily support arguments in favour of the price mechanism, 
and this is evident in wartime, when the price system is unable to coordinate agent’s 
decisions, and (decentralized) planning replaces the market. Yet Simon generalizes this 
conclusion, because externalities, instability, and uncertainty of prices prevalently 
connote the market, which consequently cannot fulfil its coordination function. 
Moreover, planning (because of a continuous interaction between individual and 
institutional planners, the outcome of which is unpredictable) is something other than 
the category described by Hayek (which is related to that of “constructivism”). 
Therefore there is no room for the dichotomy between the market (spontaneous) order 
and social planning envisaged by the Austrian economist: “order without a planner” 
exists (Simon, 1996 [1969], p. 33), but it is not spontaneous, in Hayek’s sense, in that 
is founded on a dynamic peculiar to planning structures. Finally, the concept of 
“organizational economy” as an alternative system of coordination with respect to the 
market is the last piece of Simon’s puzzle, and it constitutes a perspective alternative to 
Hayek’s approach, where the centrality of the market is a basic assumption. 
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Hayek Simon 
- BR as an argument in favour of the market (“a 
priori” assertion, in Simon’s view). 
 
- Prices communicate reliable information, guide 
the decisions of rationally limited agents, and help 
coordination of their behaviours. 
 
- The market is the sole economic decentralized 
mechanism. 
 
 
- Central planning implies centralization. 
 
- Central planning destroys evolutionary, market, 
forces.  
 
- Organizations are connoted by specific 
commands, and by a “unitary hierarchy of ends”, 
although they also rely on “rules”. 
 
- Organizations, as individual entities, are 
included in the market’s spontaneous order. 
- BR is not necessarily an argument in favour 
of the market (empirical argument). 
 
- If prices are “uncertain”, they do not 
communicate reliable information and reduce 
the ability of agents to respond rationally. 
 
- There are other economic decentralized 
systems (central planning, networks of 
organizations as global, economic, systems). 
 
- Central planning implies decentralization. 
 
- Global and local planning systems are 
interactive and evolutionary mechanisms. 
 
- Organizations adopt general strategies more 
than commands. Formal authority and 
decisional decentralization co-exist. 
 
- Organizational economies prevail over 
market economies. 
 
Table 1. Comparison between Hayek and Simon 
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